Report item - opens in a new window or tab. Seller assumes all responsibility for this listing. Item specifics Condition: Brand New: A new, unread, unused book in perfect condition with no missing or damaged pages. See all condition definitions - opens in a new window or tab Read more about the condition. About this product. Business seller information. Contact details.
e-book From Chicago to Spinoza: Poems and a Play in Three Acts
Return policy. Refer to eBay Return policy for more details. You are covered by the eBay Money Back Guarantee if you receive an item that is not as described in the listing. Shipping and handling. This item will ship to Germany , but the seller has not specified shipping options. Contact the seller - opens in a new window or tab and request a shipping method to your location.
Shipping cost cannot be calculated. Please enter a valid ZIP Code. Shipping to: Worldwide. No additional import charges at delivery! This item will be shipped through the Global Shipping Program and includes international tracking.
Benedict De Spinoza (1632—1677)
Learn more - opens in a new window or tab. There are 2 items available. Please enter a number less than or equal to 2. Select a valid country. Please enter 5 or 9 numbers for the ZIP Code. Delivery times may vary, especially during peak periods.
- The Parable of His-Story;
- Baruch Spinoza - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
- Femme Fatale: Love, Lies And The Unknown Life Of Mata Hari!
- Rendez-vous à Fontbelair (Les Noces de soie, tome 3) (Cal-Lévy-France de toujours et daujourdhui) (French Edition);
- An encyclopedia of philosophy articles written by professional philosophers.;
Handling time. Will ship within 5 business days of receiving cleared payment - opens in a new window or tab.
The seller has specified an extended handling time for this item. Taxes may be applicable at checkout. Learn more. Payment details. This definition has two components. First, a substance is what exists in itself. This is to say that it is an ultimate metaphysical subject. While other things may exist as features of a substance, substance does not exist as a feature of anything else. Second, a substance is what is conceived through itself.
- Zbigniew Herbert.
- SEX WAR: Sex War (PASSION) (Italian Edition);
- Hairdressers Night Before Christmas, A (Night Before Christmas (Gibbs)).
- Lupo Alberto. n.8 (Mondadori): Le radici. Tutte le strisce da 715 a 816 (Italian Edition);
- Join Kobo & start eReading today.
This is to say that the idea of a substance does not involve the idea of any other thing. Substances are both ontologically and conceptually independent. An attribute is not just any property of a substance - it is its very essence. So close is the association of an attribute and the substance of which it is an attribute that Spinoza denies that there is a real distinction between them.
A mode is what exists in another and is conceived through another.
Baruch Spinoza | Religion-wiki | FANDOM powered by Wikia
Specifically, it exists as a modification or an affection of a substance and cannot be conceived apart from it. In contrast to substances, modes are ontologically and conceptually dependent. God is an infinite substance. By this Spinoza means both that the number of God's attributes is unlimited and that there is no attribute that God does not possess. These are thought and extension. Spinoza moves from these definitions to demonstrate a series of propositions concerning substance in general and God in particular on the basis of which he will demonstrate that God is the one and only substance.
The following two propositions are landmarks in the overall argument and are explicitly invoked in the demonstration of IP In support of this proposition, Spinoza argues that if two or more substances were to exist they would be differentiated either by a difference in modes or by a difference in attributes. However, they could not be differentiated by a difference in modes, for substances are prior in nature to their modes.
Thus, they would have to be differentiated by a difference in attributes. Controversially, Spinoza takes this to entail that no two substances can have exactly the same set of attributes, nor can they have a common attribute. Substances must be entirely dissimilar to one another. In support of this proposition, Spinoza offers a variant of the so-called Ontological Argument. The basic consideration upon which this variant rests is that it pertains to the nature of substance to exist.
Spinoza establishes this earlier, in IP7, by appealing to the fact that substances, being entirely dissimilar to one another, cannot produce one another. Since nothing else can produce a substance, substances must be self-caused, which is to say that it pertains to the nature of substance to exist. To imagine that God does not exist is thus absurd. As a substance consisting of infinite attributes, it pertains to the divine nature to exist.
With these propositions in place, Spinoza has everything he needs to demonstrate that there is one and only one substance and that this substance is God:.
enter site The demonstration of this proposition is exceedingly simple. God exists by IP Since God possesses every attribute by ID6 , if any substance other than God were to exist, it would possess an attribute in common with God. But, since there cannot be two or more substances with a common attribute by IP5 , there can be no substance other than God.
God is the one and only substance. Most obviously, this proposition marks a break with the substance pluralism advocated by the majority of philosophers in the west. Even Descartes, from whom Spinoza learned much in the area of metaphysics, posited a plurality of mental and physical substances, along with God, whom he regarded as the paradigm of a substance. More importantly, it signals a rejection of classical theism, the idea that God is the creator of the universe who remains ontologically distinct from it and governs it according to his sovereign will.
Spinoza has nothing but scorn for this idea and dismisses it as a product of the imagination. How it is that he reconceptualizes the relation between God, the infinite substance, and the order of finite things, becomes clear only as we turn to his account of the modal system. In line with his rejection of classical theism, Spinoza famously identifies God with Nature. Nature is no longer seen as a power that is distinct from and subordinate to God, but as a power that is one and the same with divine power. In isolation, however, the phrase is relatively uninformative.
To fill out his thoughts on this matter, Spinoza distinguishes between Nature taken in its active or productive aspect, which he identifies with God or the divine attributes, and Nature taken in its derivative or produced aspect, which he identifies with the system of modes. Spinoza's use of these formulas is revealing in two respects. First, his double employment of ' Natura ' signals the ontological unity that exists between God and the system of modes. Each mode within the system is a modification of nothing other than the very substance that is God.
Second, his employment of the active ' naturans ' in the first and the passive ' naturata ' in the second signals a causal relation between God and the modal system. God is not merely the subject of modes; he is an active power that produces and sustains them. In view of the ontological unity that exists between God and the modal system, Spinoza is careful to specify that the divine causality is immanent rather that transitive. What this means is that God's causal activity does not pass outside of the divine substance to produce external effects, as it would if God were a creator in the traditional sense.
Rather, it remains wholly within the divine substance to produce the multitude of modes that constitute the modal system. Spinoza likens this to the way in which the nature of a triangle is productive of its own essential properties: "From God's supreme power, or infinite nature, infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, that is, all things, have necessarily flowed, or always follow, by the same necessity and in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows, from eternity and to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles" IP17S1.
Into this relatively simple picture, Spinoza introduces a complication. There are, he says, two types of mode. The first consists in what he calls infinite and eternal modes. These are pervasive features of the universe, each of which follows from the divine nature insofar as it follows from the absolute nature of one or another of God's attributes. Examples include motion and rest under the attribute of extension and infinite intellect under the attribute of thought. The second consists in what may be called finite and temporal modes, which are simply the singular things that populate the universe.
Modes of this type follow from the divine nature as well, but do so only as each follows from one or another of God's attributes insofar as it is modified by a modification that is itself finite and temporal. Examples include individual bodies under the attribute of extension and individual ideas under the attribute of thought. Unfortunately, Spinoza does little to explain either what these infinite and eternal modes are or what relation they have to finite and temporal modes.
For example, if laws of impact are somehow embedded in the infinite and eternal mode motion and rest, then the outcome of any particular collision will be determined by that mode together with the relevant properties speed, direction, size, etc of the bodies involved. If this is correct, then Spinoza envisions every finite mode to be fully determined by intersecting lines of causality: a horizontal line that stretches back through the series of antecedent finite modes and a vertical line that moves up through the series of infinite modes and terminates in one or another of the attributes of God.
However it may be that Spinoza ultimately conceives of the relation between infinite and finite modes, he is clear about one thing - the system of modes is an entirely deterministic system in which everything is fully determined to be and to act:. Spinoza reminds us that God's existence is necessary. It pertains to the very nature of substance to exist. Furthermore, since each and every mode follows from the necessity of the divine nature, either from the absolute nature of one or another of God's attributes, as is the case with the infinite and eternal modes, or from one or another of God's attributes insofar as it is modified by a modification that is finite, as is the case with the finite modes, they are all necessary as well.
Since there is nothing other than the divine substance and its modes, there is nothing that is contingent. Any appearance of contingency is the result of a defect in knowledge, either of God or of the order of causes. Accordingly, Spinoza makes it central to his theory of knowledge that to know a thing adequately is to know it in its necessity, as it has been fully determined by its causes.
An obvious question to ask at this point is whether it is possible for finite modes falling under one attribute to act upon and determine finite modes falling under another attribute.